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Many workers with low levels of educational attainment immigrated to the United States in recent
decades. Large inflows of less-educated immigrants would reduce wages paid to comparably-educated
native-born workers if the two groups compete for similar jobs. In a simple model exploiting comparative
advantage, however, we show that if less-educated foreign and native-born workers specialize in performing
complementary tasks, immigration will cause natives to reallocate their task supply, thereby reducing
downward wage pressure. Using individual data on the task intensity of occupations across US states
from 1960-2000, we then demonstrate that foreign-born workers specialize in occupations that require
manual tasks such as cleaning, cooking, and building. Immigration causes natives -- who have a better
understanding of local networks, rules, customs, and language -- to pursue jobs requiring interactive
tasks such as coordinating, organizing, and communicating. Simulations show that this increased specialization
mitigated negative wage consequences of immigration for less-educated native-born workers, especially
in states with large immigration flows.
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Immigration has signiﬁcantly aﬀected the US labor supply during the last few decades, particularly among
workers with limited formal schooling. Economists continue to debate the wage eﬀe c t so ft h e s el a r g ei n ﬂows on
native-born workers. If workers’ skills are diﬀerentiated mainly by their level of educational attainment, and
workers of diﬀerent education levels are imperfectly substitutable, then a large ﬂow of immigrants with limited
schooling should increase wages paid to highly-educated natives and reduce wages paid to less-educated ones.
This intuitive approach receives support in Borjas (2003, 2006) and Borjas and Katz (2005). They use US
national data to argue that immigration reduced real wages paid to native-born workers without a high school
degree by four to ﬁve percent between 1980 and 2000. In contrast, area studies by Card (2001, 2007), Card and
Lewis (2007), and Lewis (2005) employ city and state level data and ﬁnd almost no eﬀect of immigration on the
wages of less-educated native workers. Ottaviano and Peri (2006) note that the eﬀects of immigration crucially
depend upon the degree of substitution between native and foreign-born workers within each education group.
That is, native and foreign-born workers of comparable educational attainment might possess unique skills that
lead them to specialize in diﬀerent occupations, which would mitigate wage losses from immigration.1
We advance this debate by providing a theory to explain why native and foreign-born workers with little
formal education may be imperfect substitutes in production. We then measure the tasks these individuals
perform in their occupations so that we can estimate the eﬀect of immigration on wages. We argue that
immigrants are likely to have imperfect language skills, incomplete knowledge of productive networks, and only
scant awareness of social norms and the intricacies of productive interactions. However, they have manual
and physical skills similar to those of native-born workers. Therefore, they have a comparative advantage
in occupations requiring manual labor-intensive tasks, while less-educated native-born workers will have an
advantage in jobs demanding interactive and language-intensive tasks. Immigration encourages specialization
so that foreign-born workers create little adverse wage consequences for less-educated natives.
We begin in Section 2 by developing a simple model of comparative advantage and incomplete specialization
of workers. Workers’ skill endowments imply that immigration reduces the compensation paid to manual tasks
and increases the compensation paid to interactive ones. The complementary nature of the two skills and
the reallocation of native workers toward interactive tasks favor wages paid to native workers. The eﬀects
compensate (in part or entirely) for the depressing eﬀect of immigration on the wage paid to manual tasks.
Next, Section 3 describes data for the 50 US states (plus the District of Columbia) from 1960 to 2000 that we
use to test our model. To measure the intensity of manual and interactive tasks supplied by workers, we use a
1Manacorda et. al. (2006) ﬁnd similar imperfect substitutability between native and immigrant workers for the UK. Other
important contributions to the literature on immigration and wages include Altonji and Card (1991), Borjas (1994), (1995), (1999),
Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997), Butcher and Card (1991), Card (1990), Friedberg and Hunt (1995), Friedberg (2001), and
National Research Council (1997).
2dataset assembled by Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) that merges data on job task requirements based upon
the US Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) with Census occupation classiﬁcations.
We adopt two of their variables; one captures the manual labor content of each job (called “eye-hand-foot
coordination” skills), and the other accounts for an occupation’s interactive content (called “direction-control-
planning”). Using IPUMS microdata from the Census (Ruggles et. al. (2005)), we then construct the supply
of each task for native and foreign-born workers by state, as well as the change in tasks supplied over time.
The empirical analysis in Section 4 strongly supports three key implications of our theory. In states with large
inﬂows of less-educated immigrants: i) less-educated native-born workers shifted their supply toward interactive
tasks at a faster rate than in states with low immigration; ii) the total supply of manual relative to interactive
skills increased at a faster rate than in states with low immigration; and iii) the wage paid to manual relative
to interactive tasks decreased more than in states with low immigration. Less-educated natives have responded
to immigration by leaving manual task-intensive occupations for interaction-intensive ones. These results are
upheld by two stage least squares regressions that instrument for the variation of less-educated immigrants
across states using two diﬀerent sets of exogenous variables, both of which exploit the increased level of Mexican
immigration as an exogenous supply shift. The ﬁrst instrument follows a strategy similar to Card (2001), Card
and Di Nardo (2000), and Cortes (2006) by using the imputed share of Mexican workers (based upon 1960 state
demographics and subsequent national growth rates) as a proxy for the share of less-educated immigrants in a
state. The second set of instruments interacts decade indicator variables with the distance of a state’s center of
gravity to the Mexico-US border, its square, and a border dummy.
Critics of past area studies have argued that the methodology fails to identify wage losses because the eﬀects
of immigration are diﬀused nation-wide through internal migration. However, Section 4.2.3 demonstrates that
increased immigration among less-educated workers in a state neither reduces the relative wage of less-educated
native-born workers nor induces their out-migration.2 Our paper provides a new potential explanation for this
phenomenon — rather than ﬂee their home states for new locales, natives respond to immigration by specializing
in jobs that are intensive in interactive production tasks. This stabilizes native-born wages, and removes their
incentive to migrate.
Given the positive wage eﬀect of specializing in interactive skill-intensive occupations, native-born realloca-
tion of productive task supply has protected their real wages and mitigated losses due to immigration. In Section
5, we use the parameters of our model and our empirical results to calculate the eﬀect of immigration on average
wages paid to native-born workers with a high school degree or less. Task complementarities and increasing
specialization among native-born workers imply that the wage impact of immigration on less-educated natives,
while usually negative, is quite small. These ﬁndings agree with those of Card (2001), Card and Lewis (2007),
2See Card (2001), Lewis (2003), and Peri (2007) for further defense of area studies.
3and Ottaviano and Peri (2006) and enrich the structural framework to analyze the eﬀect of immigration used
in Borjas (2003), Borjas and Katz (2005), Ottaviano and Peri (2006), and Peri (2007).
2 Theoretical Model
We advocate a simple general equilibrium model of comparative advantages in task performance, rather than
ﬁnal goods production, to illustrate the eﬀects of immigration on specialization and wages.3 We develop the
model here, and provide more detailed derivations of the equations in the Appendix. We will test the model’s
implications in Section 4, and use its structure and empirically-estimated elasticities to evaluate the eﬀects of
immigration on wages paid to less-educated native-born workers in Section 5.
2.1 Production
Consider an economy that combines two intermediates, YH and YL,i naCES production function to produce













The parameter σ ∈ (0,∞) measures the elasticity of substitution between the two intermediate goods, while
β and (1 − β) capture the relative productivity of YL and YH in the production of Y .W ec h o o s eY to be the
numeraire, and assume it is assembled by perfectly competitive ﬁrms that minimize costs and earn no proﬁts.
This ensures that the prices of YL and YH (denoted PL and PH) are equal to their marginal products.
T h ei n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d sa r ep r o d u c e db yw o r k e r so fd i ﬀerent education levels. Low education workers
(with total labor supply equal to L) produce YL, and high education workers (H) produce YH.W h i l e CES
production functions combining the services of high and low education labor are widely used in economics,4 we
add to the framework by assuming that less-educated workers must perform both “manual” and “interactive”
tasks to produce YL. Manual tasks include functions such as building, moving, and operating equipment, while
interactive tasks involve coordinating, directing, and organizing people. Let less-educated workers supply M
manual-task inputs and I interactive-task inputs. These tasks combine to produce YL a c c o r d i n gt ot h eCES
function in Equation (2), where βL ∈ (0,1) captures the relative productivity of manual skills and θL ∈ (0,∞)
measures the elasticity of substitution between M and I.
3Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) develop an interesting new theory of oﬀ-shoring that builds upon a process of international
task division. Their model has features and implications similar to the one developed in this paper.
4See the literature on cross-country income diﬀerences (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001; Caselli and Coleman, 2006), technological











Highly-educated workers similarly perform two tasks to produce YH. Like less-educated workers, highly-
educated workers supply interactive skills. Rather than perform manual functions, however, highly-educated
workers supply analytical (or quantitative) skills. To simplify the analysis and focus o nt h er o l eo fl e s s - e d u c a t e d
w o r k e r si np r o d u c t i o n( a n do nt h ei m p a c to fi m m i g r a n ts on those workers), we assume that interactive and
analytical skills are perfectly substitutable in the production of YH.T h u s ,YH is produced according to a linear
technology equal to the total supply of highly-educated workers. That is, YH = H.5
Competitive labor markets and producers of YL and YH yield the relative task demand function in Equation













2.2 Relative Supply of Tasks with Heterogeneous Workers
Each highly-educated worker is identical from a productive point of view and supplies one unit of task input
to produce one unit of good YH. The wage of each highly-educated worker equals the marginal productivity of
YH in (1) so that WH = PH. In contrast, less-educated workers are heterogeneous and diﬀer from each other
in their relative task productivity. In particular, each agent j is characterized by a speciﬁc level of eﬀectiveness
in performing the two tasks. Let mj and ij represent the eﬀectiveness of worker j in performing manual and
interactive tasks, respectively. The one unit of labor supplied by less-educated worker j can be fully used to
provide mj units of manual tasks or ij units of interactive tasks. Workers with higher eﬀectiveness in a particular
task will spend relatively more of their labor endowment performing it, but we assume that decreasing returns
imply that an agent will not choose to fully specialize.
Let lj be the share of personal labor endowment (share of time) worker j spends performing manual tasks
so that 1−lj i st h et i m es p e n tp e r f o r m i n gi n t e r a c t i v et a s k s .W o r k e rj’s supply of manual task units is indicated
by μj =( lj)
δ mj, while its supply of interactive task units is ιj =( 1− lj)
δ ij.T h ep a r a m e t e rδ ∈ (0,1) captures
the decreasing returns from performing a single task. Each worker takes the wages paid to tasks as given and
chooses an allocation of labor between manual and interactive tasks to maximize her labor income given in
Equation (4).
5A previous version of this paper permitted imperfect substitutability between interactive and analytical tasks. For this version,
however, we intend to focus empirically on the eﬀect of less-educated immigrants. Since the richer model of YH has no implications
for less-educated workers, we leave it and the empirical analysis of task specialization and complementarities among highly- educated
w o r k e r st oad i ﬀerent paper.
5WL,j =( lj)
δ mjwM +( 1− lj)
δ ijwI. (4)
By maximizing wages with respect to lj, we can identify the equilibrium relative supply of manual versus
interactive task-units for worker j (Equation (5)), which depends positively on relative task compensation and














Aggregate task supply simply equals the summation over all less-educated workers. That is, M =
P
j μj =
Lμ and I =
P
j ιj = Lι,w h e r eμ and ι represent the average unit-supply of manual and interactive tasks.
Aggregate relative task supply (Equation (6)) is then a function of relative wages and the average relative








































In equilibrium, relative task provision (Equation (8)) is a positive function of both the relative productivity
of the tasks in the production of YL and the average relative eﬀectiveness of workers. An increase in βL raises M
I




raises supply. Relative compensation (Equation (9)) is also a positive function




; a population that is more eﬀective in manual task performance (on



























All workers receive the same relative compensation in equilibrium. Equation (10) identiﬁes an individual
worker’s relative supply of tasks, which is positively related to its eﬀectiveness in performing them. In con-
trast, the average worker’s relative eﬀectiveness will negatively aﬀect an individual’s supply. This is because a
6In practice (and in anticipation of our empirical strategy), workers are likely to select diﬀerent allocations of their time between
manual and interactive tasks according to their occupation choice. Thus, we assume each unique allocation represents a diﬀerent
occupation. A worker will choose an occupation with the time allocation (l,1−l) that maximizes its wage income, which depends on
its relative eﬃciency (mj/ij) of task performance. For given relative wages, there is a one-to-one correspondence between relative
eﬃciency and occupation choice, as well as between relative eﬃciency and the relative supply of tasks (Equation (5)). Hence, the
choice of occupation reveals the comparative advantage of a worker.
6population with higher manual abilities would supply more units of manual tasks and depress its relative wage,


















The left panel of Figure 1 illustrates the wage and provision of tasks for an economy. Bold lines represent (in
logarithmic scale) aggregate relative task supply and demand. Point E0 identiﬁes the equilibrium corresponding
to Equations (8) and (9). Dotted lines to the left and right of the aggregate supply curve represent relative
individual task supply for workers j1 (with low manual eﬀectiveness) and j2 (high manual eﬀectiveness). The
equilibrium supply for each type of worker is identiﬁed by the point where its individual supply curve crosses
the level of equilibrium compensation (at points 1 and 2, respectively). Intuitively, an increase in βL would shift
aggregate demand to the right, increase the equilibrium relative compensation for manual tasks, and increase




would shift aggregate supply to the
left, decrease the relative compensation for manual tasks, and reduce the relative supply of manual tasks for
each worker of a given relative eﬀectiveness.
2.3 Two Types of Workers: Eﬀects of Immigration on Relative Task Supply and
Returns to Tasks
The model in Section 2.2 analyzes average wages and task provision for a single group of heterogenous workers.
In this section, we expand the model to incorporate a second heterogenous group that diﬀers from the ﬁrst only




. Suppose the initial group of less-educated “domestic” (or





. Now allow immigration so that a new group





enters the labor force.
While there is no clear reason for immigrants to be less productive in performing manual tasks such as building
a wall, picking fruits, or cutting jewelry, they are certainly not as proﬁcient as natives in communicating with
other native-born workers, organizing people, serving customers, managing relationships, or other interactive











. In other words, foreign-born workers have, on average, comparative advantages in
performing manual tasks, while native workers have comparative advantages in performing interactive tasks.7
This assumption allows us to analyze how immigration aﬀects wages and task provision.
Equation (3) continues to describe relative aggregate demand. Equation (11) represents the relative supply
of tasks in the economy obtained by summing the skills provided by each group.













The term 0 <f= IF/(IF + ID) < 1 is the share of interactive tasks supplied by foreign-born workers. It
is a simple monotonically increasing transformation of the share of foreign-born among less-educated workers,
s = LF/(LF + LD). Hence, the aggregate relative supply of tasks in the economy is a weighted average of
each group’s supply, and the weights are closely related to the share of each group in employment. The relative














, respectively. Equation (12) describes the equilibrium relative compensation of tasks when the average













































By substituting this wage equilibrium into aggregate relative supply (6) for domestic workers, we ﬁnd their



































































The right panel of Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium in an economy with native and foreign-born labor.
Due to comparative advantages in manual tasks, immigrants’ supply is to the right of domestic workers’ supply.
The overall relative supply (represented by the thickest line in the panel) is a weighted average of the two —
the distance of the average supply curves from those of immigrants and domestic workers is proportional to
f and 1 − f, respectively. An increase in the share of foreign-born employment (which would raise f)w o u l d
shift the overall relative supply closer to that of foreign-born workers. Point E1 represents the equilibrium
with immigrants. Immigration reduces compensation paid to manual relative to interactive tasks, while also
increasing the relative provision of the skills. However, the average manual versus interactive task supply of
native workers (point D) is smaller than in the case without immigration. Finally, the manual versus interactive
task supply of immigrants (point F) is larger than for native workers.
The equilibrium results summarized in Equations (12), (13), and (14) provide the basis for comparing
economies diﬀering from each other in the presence of foreign-born workers. As f increases from 0 (only
8domestic workers) to positive values, our model has speciﬁc comparative static implications for the relative
task supply of natives, overall relative task supply, and relative task compensation. We summarize the main
implications in three propositions that will motivate our empirical analysis. We begin with a Lemma, to be
empirically validated, that states our comparative advantage assumption.















Proof: Consider individual supply (10) for the average immigrant and domestic worker. The two expressions
























ιD . Multiplying the numerator and the denominator of the ﬁrst ratio
by LF, and the numerator and the denominator of the second ratio by LD we obtain MF
IF > MD
ID . QED.
The relative eﬀectiveness of workers is not observable empirically, but occupation choices reveal their intensity
of task supply. Thus, we can compare the relative task supply of natives and immigrants to test whether the
main assumption of our model is correct. The assumption also facilitates the following three propositions.
Proposition 1: A higher foreign-born share (s) of less-educated workers in an economy induces lower






























is monotonically increasing in f.T h es h a r ef, in turn, depends positively on s (speciﬁcally, ∂f/∂s = ιFιD
(sιF+(1−s)ιD)2 >










D is a negative
function of s. QED.
Proposition 2: A higher foreign-born share (s) of less-educated workers in an economy induces a larger
supply of manual relative to interactive tasks among less-educated workers overall, M∗
I∗ .
























Proposition 3: A higher foreign-born share (s) of less-educated workers in an economy induces lower






























I depends negatively on s. QED.





would have very similar



























. Section 3 will





have been rising together over time and exhibit a mild positive correlation across
states so that they are likely to reinforce each-other.
In our empirical analysis, we ﬁrst check the validity of the inequality expressed in the Lemma. Then we test
the qualitative predictions of the three propositions using data for US states from 1960-2000.
2.4 Eﬀect of Immigration on Real Wages
The model above has clear qualitative predictions for how immigration aﬀects the relative supply and compen-
sation of tasks. We can use the model to simulate immigration’s eﬀect on the average wage of highly-educated
workers, less-educated workers, less-educated native-born workers, and workers employed in speciﬁc occupations
(i.e., for individual j)o n c ew eh a v ee s t i m a t e dt h ep a r a m e t e r sa n dm e a s u r e dh o wM, I,a n dH have responded
to immigration.
Competitive markets ensure that inputs will earn wages equal to their marginal products. On average, both
highly-educated and less-educated workers earn the unit price of the intermediate good they produce. The
logarithmic diﬀerential of their marginal products provides the measures of immigration’s eﬀect on these groups




is the income share paid to highly-educated workers













































Equation (15) provides a direct measure of immigration’s eﬀect on highly-educated labor. More interestingly,
however, we can decompose the eﬀect on wages paid to less-educated workers into its manual and interactive










from logarithmic diﬀerentials of their
marginal products. Equation (19) then represents wages paid to less-educated workers as the average manual
and interactive wage eﬀects weighted by their respective supplies, where κM =( wMM/WLL)i st h em a n u a l














































































Calculations of the eﬀect of immigration on the average native-born less-educated worker then requires two
additional steps. First we weight the change in compensation by the average task supply of natives (μD and ιD)
rather than by μ and ι. This implies a higher relative weight on ∆wI
wI and lower one on ∆wM
wM since native workers
supply relatively more interactive tasks. Second, the reallocation of native-born task provision generates wage
eﬀects equal to (∆μ)wM +( ∆ι)wI.8 Altogether, Equation (20) expresses the net eﬀects of immigration on




















To obtain the eﬀect of immigration on the wage paid to occupation j, we weight the percentage wage
changes by the supply of each task in that occupation (Equation (21)). There is no second order eﬀect because














We will use the expressions (15), (16), (20) and (21) in Section 5 to evaluate the impact of immigration
between 1990 and 2000 on average wages paid to highly-educated workers, less-educated workers, less-educated
native workers, and speciﬁc occupational groups at the national level and for selected US states. Note that
expressions (17) and (18) contain the unmeasurable term ∆YL
YL .S i n c eYL is produced under perfect competition
using services of less-educated workers only, however, the total income generated in this sector will be distributed
to less-educated workers. This allows us to relate changes in the production of YL to small changes of inputs M
and I as in Equation (22); the percentage change in YL is equal to the sum of the percentage changes of inputs













8While in the theoretical model the change in task supply generates only a second order eﬀect, in the empirical analysis it is
important to control for diﬀerences in wM and wI that may be due to a host of causes not necessarily captured by this model.
113 Data Description and Preliminary Evidence
This section describes how we construct measures of task supply to test the main implications of the model. The
IPUMS dataset by Ruggles et. al. (2005) provides individual-level data on personal characteristics, employment,
wages, immigration status, and occupation choice. As consistent with the literature, we identify immigrants as
those who are born outside of the United States and were not citizens at birth. To focus on the period of rising
immigration, we consider census years from 1960 to 2000. We include only non-military wage-earning employees
who were eighteen years of age or older and had worked at least one week prior to the census year.
Since the immigrant share of employment varies greatly across US states, we adopt states as the econometric
unit of analysis.9 One critique of this approach is that US states are open economies, so the eﬀects of immigration
in one state could spill into others through the migration of natives. We demonstrate in Section 4.2.3, however,
that natives do not respond to immigration by moving.10 Instead, our analysis provides a new explanation for
the observed small wage and employment response: Native-born workers protect themselves from competition
with immigrants (and partly beneﬁt from their inﬂow) by specializing in interactive task-intensive occupations.
State-level regressions, therefore, remain informative.
3.1 Task Variables
We begin by measuring the task intensity of each occupation so that we can obtain aggregate task supply
measures for natives and immigrants by education level and state. To do so, we use data collected and organized
by Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) (hereinafter ALM) who analyze how the diﬀusion of computers altered
the task supply of workers from routine to non-routine tasks.11 We merge the ALM data with individual-level
Census and CPS data, and then aggregate ﬁgures to obtain the data used in regressions. We brieﬂy describe
the merging procedure and the characteristics of the task variables here.12
Between 1939 and 1991, the US Department of Labor periodically evaluated the tasks required for more
than 12,000 occupations. The published results are available in ﬁve editions of the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles (DOT). ALM aggregate the data from each of the two most recent versions (1977 and 1991) by gender
and three-digit Census Occupation Codes (COC) for ﬁve occupational skills.13 We restrict our focus to the two
variables that best capture the interactive and manual tasks described in our model.
We measure the interactive skill content of an occupation by the level of Direction, Control, and Planning
9Also see Card (2001, 2007), Lewis (2005), Card and Lewis (2007), Cortes (2006), and Kugler and Yuksel (2006).
10Card (2001, 2007) and Peri (2007) provide concurring evidence.
11We are extremely grateful to David Autor for providing the data, which has also been used recently by Bacolod and Blum
(2006) to analyze skill premia and the gender wage gap and by Bacolod et al. (2006) to analyze the eﬀect of urban agglomerations
on the premium of speciﬁc skills.
12For more details on the construction of the variables, we refer to the Appendix of Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003).
13Diﬀerentiation by gender within each census occupation occurs because “the gender distribution of DOT occupations diﬀers
substantially within COC occupation cells.”
12(DCP) activities that it requires. DCP takes ordinal values ranging from zero to ten and maintains high values
in occupations requiring non-routine managerial and interpersonal skills. ALM deﬁne DCP as “Adaptability to
accepting responsibility for the direction, control, or planning of people and activities.” The highest DCP values
occur for managerial occupations, while the lowest are found among traditional blue-collar laborers. Conversely,
Eye-Hand-Foot coordination (EHF) measures the occupational demand for non-routine manual skills. ALM
describe EHF as the “Ability to move the hand and foot coordinately with each other and in accordance with
visual stimuli.” Ordinal values also range from zero to ten, but are highest in occupations that demand physical
precision including dancers, athletes, and ﬁreﬁghters. The lowest occur primarily in white-collar jobs, including
a number of natural science and teaching professions.14
The somewhat arbitrary scale of measurement for the task variables encourages ALM to convert the values
into percentiles. We follow a similar approach. First, we use the ALM crosswalk to match task variable values
with individual demographic information from the Census in 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990. Unfortunately, changes
in the Census occupation classiﬁcation scheme prevent us from developing a crosswalk for the 2000 Census. As
an alternative, we match the ALM variables to individual-level CPS data from 1998, 1999, and 2000. We assume
that the sample obtained merging those years is collectively representative of the US workforce in 2000.15 Next,
we re-scale the task variables by assigning percentile values according to the 1960 distribution of workers. This
standardization of values between 0 and 1 facilitates a more intuitive interpretation of their changes over time.16
Occupational percentile values facilitate construction of MD
ID and MF
IF ratios to match our theoretical model to
the empirics. MF and MD represent the average (weighted by the Census weight of the individuals) EHF values
for foreign and native-born workers, respectively, for the given unit of observation (usually states). Similarly,
IF and ID are weighted averages of DCP for foreign and native-born workers.
3.2 Aggregate Trends and Stylized Evidence
By construction, the median percentile values of each task variable equals 0.50 in 1960. Evolution in the
occupational composition of the US workforce between 1960 and 2000 has caused median values to exhibit
trends over the period. Table 1 displays the skill values (and occupations) associated with the median worker.
The reported values and trends are similar to those presented in Figure 1 of ALM. In particular, there has been
a large decline in the supply of manual tasks as the median EHF value fell by almost 35% (from 0.50 to 0.33) of
its initial value. The US has also experienced a large increase in the supply of interactive tasks, as the median
14Note that since both DCP and EHF refer to non-routine tasks (as deﬁned in ALM), their supply was not directly displaced by
the adoption of computer technology — a prominent phenomenon during the period considered. Computer adoption or technological
change can still confound the relative supply of tasks, however, so we control for it in our empirical analysis.
15Each of these Census and CPS datasets is available from IPUMS. We choose to use information from several CPS years to
increase the sample size. We avoid 2001 data to ensure that the events of September 11 will not aﬀect results.
16We standardize values using both the 1977 and 1991 DOT datasets. For most regression speciﬁcations, we assign percentile
values based upon the 1977 DOT to individuals from 1960 to 1980, and values from the 1991 DOT to workers in 1990 and 2000.
13DCP value increased by more than 24% (from 0.50 to 0.62). These trends may be due to technological change,
changes in educational attainment, and/or changes in the industrial composition of the economy.
We are primarily interested in less-educated workers (i.e., those with at most a high school degree) and the
diﬀerences in tasks supplied by US and foreign-born workers. Figure 2 reports the aggregate relative supply
of manual versus interactive tasks for less-educated native, foreign-born, and recent immigrant workers in each
decade between 1960 and 2000.17 Three features of Figure 2 are relevant. First, in accordance with the Lemma
of Section 2.3, foreign-born workers with a high school degree or less always provided, on average, more manual
relative to interactive tasks when compared to native workers with similar education. This diﬀerence is even
more apparent when we only consider recent immigrants. New immigrants supply a disproportionate amount
of manual tasks and, over time, become more similar to natives in their task supply. Second, the gap between
the relative supply among native and immigrant workers has increased signiﬁcantly over time. This is due to
two phenomena — the increase in the share of recent immigrants among foreign-born and the increased relative
supply of manual tasks by recent immigrants. In 2000, immigrant supply of manual versus interactive skills
was 30% higher than for natives. Third, less-educated native workers have signiﬁcantly decreased their relative
supply. While technology may have contributed to this phenomenon, immigrants exhibited the opposite trend.
Considering that the share of immigrants among less-educated workers grew substantially during the forty years
analyzed, and that immigrants relative specialization in manual tasks increased, the aggregate trend is consistent
with Proposition 1. Native-born workers progressively left manual occupations and adopted interactive ones as
immigrants increasingly satisﬁed the demand for manual skills.
Table 2 provides examples of occupational shifts responsible for changes in the task performance of less-
educated native-born workers by listing selected occupations, their task intensity, and the percentage of foreign-
born employees in each job in 2000. We highlight pairs of occupations in which each job is within the same
industrial sector and has similar education requirements, but also requires quite diﬀerent tasks. For example,
agricultural laborers and farm coordinators are both in agriculture and require little formal education. However,
the ﬁrst uses mostly manual skills (such as cultivating, picking, sorting) and the second uses mostly interactive
skills (such as supervising, organizing, planning, keeping contacts). This is conﬁrmed by the relative manual
to interactive task value of 2.5 for the ﬁrst occupation and 0.43 for the second. Both occupations were ﬁlled
by US-born workers in 1960. By 2000, however, most agricultural laborers (63%) were foreign-born, while farm
coordinators were still almost exclusively US-natives (96%). As immigrants took manual jobs, native workers
in agriculture could specialize in occupations requiring coordination and managerial tasks. Thus, even within
the same sector and for similar education requirements, we see evidence of specialization.
Figure 3 provides stylized evidence on the systematic association between immigration and native workers’
17Recent immigrants are foreign-born workers who have been in the US less than 10 years. The 1960 Census does not report the
variable “years in the U.S.” for foreign-born individuals.
14behavior across states. It plots the foreign-born share of less-educated workers and the level of manual versus
interactive tasks supplied by less-educated native workers for each state in 2000. While this does not control
for any state-speciﬁc factor, the negative correlation is clear. In states with a higher share of immigrants
among less-educated workers, native workers perform signiﬁcantly more interactive relative to manual tasks.
The empirical analysis of the next section tests whether part of this remarkable diﬀerence in specialization of
n a t i v ew o r k e r sa c r o s ss t a t e si sd u et oi m m i g r a t i o n ,a n dh o wt h i sm i g h ta ﬀect wages paid to native-born workers.
4 Empirical Results
In this section we test the Lemma and three Propositions of Section 2.3 for less-educated workers (generally
those with a high school degree or fewer years of schooling). First, Section 4.1 veriﬁes that foreign-born workers
provide, on average, a higher relative supply of manual versus interactive tasks than native workers do. Section
4.2 then tests the correlation between the foreign born share of workers and the relative supply of tasks by native
w o r k e r sa c r o s ss t a t e s( P r o p o s i t i o n1 ) . I n s t r u m e ntal variable regressions show that immigrant inﬂows cause
natives to specialize. Section 4.3 tests the eﬀect of immigration on the aggregate supply of relative tasks across
states (Proposition 2). Section 4.4 performs robustness checks by controlling for exogenous demand factors, and
Section 4.5 quantiﬁes the eﬀects of immigration on the relative compensation of manual and interactive tasks
(Proposition 3).
4.1 Immigrants’ Relative Supply of Tasks
The aggregate data shown in Figure 2 conﬁrm that the relative supply of manual versus interactive tasks by
foreign-born workers in the US was larger than the relative supply among native workers in each census year
since 1960. This tendency also characterizes the overwhelming majority of US states. Table 3 reports the
percentage of US state-year observations satisfying the inequality MF
IF > MD
ID . Note that for the 28 observations
in which foreign-born workers were less than 1% of less-educated employment, the small sample size (often 10 to
20 individuals) would lead to massive error in the construction of MF
IF . Therefore, we exclude these observations
from our inequality checks.
The ﬁrst column of Table 3 reports that MF
IF > MD
ID for 80% of the state-year observations in which more
than 1% of less-educated employment was foreign-born. In column 2 we consider only the 108 observations with
at least 5% of immigrants among the less-educated workers; the inequality holds in 88% of the cases. Column
3 demonstrates that all states with at least 10% of immigrants among the less-educated satisfy the inequality.
Columns 4, 5, and 6 check the inequality for the same groups as columns 1, 2, and 3, but consider only recent
immigrants in the construction of relative task supply. The percentage of states satisfying the inequality is,
15respectively, 87%, 96% and 100%. On average, an individual state’s immigrants work in occupations requiring
relatively more manual tasks than natives do. This relationship is stronger for recent immigrants and in states
with large immigrant populations.
Figure 4 plots the values of MF
IF and MD
ID for observations with more than 10% of immigrants among less-
educated workers. Figure 5 shows the same variables when we only include recent immigrants in the calculation
of MF and IF. All points lie above the 45◦-line since each satisﬁes MF
IF > MD
ID . Moreover, we see that in some
cases the relative supply MF
IF for foreign-born workers is as much as 50% larger than the corresponding supply
of natives. In the case of recent immigrants, the diﬀerences can be as large as 100%.
4.2 Immigration and the Response of Natives
The regressions in this section examine the relationship between less-educated immigrants and task supply of
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(Share foreign L)st represents the foreign-born share of less-educated workers.18 We control for year (τt)a n d
state (αs) ﬁxed eﬀects, and εst represents a non correlated zero-mean disturbance. If γ is negative and signiﬁcant,
then native-born workers respond to immigration by specializing in occupations less intense in manual versus
interactive tasks, and Proposition 1 holds.
E m p i r i c a l l y ,w ec a ng ob e y o n dt h es i m p l et e s to fP r o position 1 and determine whether immigration has
a stronger relationship with the average native-born supply of manual (μD)o ri n t e r a c t i v e( ιD)t a s k s . 19 In






=l n( μD)st − ln(ιD)st,i tm u s tb e
also true that γ = γM − γI.
ln(μD)st = αM
s + τM




t + γI (Share foreign L)st + εI
st (25)
Relationships uncovered by regressions of (23) could reﬂect demand characteristics (such as sector com-
position or technology) speciﬁc to state-year observations. Though we control more formally for sector and
18The foreign-born share was called s i nS e c t i o n2 .H e r ew eu s et h em o r ee x p l i c i tShare foreign L to avoid confusion with the
subscript s indicating states.
19Recall that μD =
MD
LD and ιD =
ID
LD .
16technological variables at the state level in Section 4.4, here we note that immigration should have a similar
relationship with the relative task supply of foreign-born workers as it does with natives if results arise due to











t + γF (Share foreign L)st + εF
st (26)
Table 4 presents the least squares estimates of γ, γM, γI,a n dγF in the ﬁrst through fourth rows, respectively,
for diﬀerent samples and variable deﬁnitions. Columns 1 through 3 use EHF and DCP variables obtained from
the 1991 DOT. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation includes all less-educated workers to construct the aggregate state-year
variables and weights each observation by its employment. Column 2, in contrast, includes only male workers.
Column 3 returns to the full sample of workers, but does not weight the observations in the least square estimates.
Columns 4 through 6 follow the same methodologies as columns 1-3, but use the 1977 DOT deﬁnitions. Finally,
columns 7 to 9 use the 1977 DOT deﬁnitions for the 1960, 1970, and 1980 observations, and the 1991 DOT for
1990 and 2000.21
Three important results emerge. First, the estimates of γ uphold Proposition 1. The coeﬃcients are negative,
between -0.18 and -0.29, and always signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0. Most of the weighted least squares estimates
(our preferred method since it accounts for the large variation in labor market size across states) are around
-0.20 and are stable across speciﬁcations. Thus, a one percentage-point increase in the foreign-born share of
less-educated workers is associated with a 0.2% decline in the relative supply of manual versus interactive tasks
among natives. Second, this decrease is primarily achieved through a rise in the supply of interactive tasks,
rather than a fall in natives’ manual task supply. A large inﬂow of immigrants performing manual tasks is
associated with increased demand for complementary interactive tasks provided by natives. Third, there is no
systematic association between the foreign-born share and their relative supply of tasks. In the few instances
where the estimate of γF is signiﬁcant, it is also positive. Thus, state-speciﬁc demand factors are unlikely to
generate the negative correlation captured by γ, as they would have similar eﬀect on task intensity of immigrants.
4.2.1 Instrumental Variable Estimation
To argue that our estimates of γ represent the response of native supply to immigration (i.e. that the direction
of causation goes from immigration to a change in native skill supply), we need to ensure that the cross-state
variation of less-educated immigrants is driven by supply shifts. A particularly relevant concern is whether un-





,w o u l dg e n e r a t e





(the scenario supported by the data
presented in Section 4.1) would have no clear implications for γF, though γ would still be negative.
21This last merged deﬁnition captures the changes in task supply due to changes in employment across occupations as well as
the change in task supply within occupations. Hence it is our preferred deﬁnition in our analysis.
17observed technology and demand factors, which may diﬀer across states due to variation in sector composition,
have simultaneously increased the productivity (demand) of interactive tasks and attracted immigrants.22 To
establish causality, we use two sets of instruments that build upon the fact that Mexican immigration, docu-
mented and undocumented, has represented a large share of the increase in less-educated immigrants to the
US beginning in the 1970s and becoming more prominent in the 1980s and 1990s. This inﬂow, independent of
state-speciﬁc demand shocks, can be exploited as an exogenous supply shift as long as we can diﬀerentiate ﬂows
across states. Thus, our two sets of instruments are the imputed share of Mexican immigrants in a state and
the state’s proximity to the Mexico-US border.
Beginning with Card (2001), several studies23 of immigration’s eﬀect on state or city economies have used
instrumental variables that exploit two facts. First, new immigrants — especially those with lower education —
tend to move to the same areas in which previous immigrants from their country live.24 Second, the countries
of origin among foreign-born workers have changed drastically between 1960 and 2000. The US has experienced
a large increase of immigrants from Mexico and Latin America, a moderate increase of immigrants from China
and Asia, and a drastic decrease of immigrants from Europe. Together, these facts provide a way to use location
preferences as factors aﬀecting the supply of foreign-born workers across states and time that are uncorrelated
with state-speciﬁc demand (productivity).
We impute the share of Mexican workers in total employment within a state and use this measure as an
instrument for the share of immigrants among less-educated workers. To do so, we ﬁrst record the actual
share of Mexicans in the employment of state s in 1960 (sh MEXs,1960), and then assume that the growth
rate of the Mexican share of employment between 1960 and year t was equal across states. Thus, Equation
( 2 7 )i m p u t e ss h a r e si ny e a rt,w h e r e( 1 + g MEX)1960−t is the growth factor of Mexican-born employment
nationwide between 1960 and year t,a n d( 1+g US)s,1960−t is the growth factor of US-born workers in state s
between 1960 and year t.T h ei d e n t i ﬁcation power of the instrument is based on the fact that some states (such
as California and Texas) had a larger share of Mexican immigrants in 1960 relative to others. These states will
also have larger imputed shares of Mexicans in 1970 through 2000 and, due to the educational composition of
this group, will have a larger immigrant share among less-educated workers.
\ sh MEXs,t = sh MEXs,1960
(1 + g MEX)1960−t
(1 + g US)s,1960−t
(27)
Our second instrument also exploits the exogenous increase in Mexican immigration and measures the dis-
tance of a state from the US-Mexico border. First, we use the coordinates of the center of gravity for the popu-
22N o t e ,h o w e v e r ,t h a ts u c ha ne x p l a n a t i o nc o n ﬂicts with our ﬁnding that states attracting a larger share of immigrants do not
attract immigrants who supply more interactive skills.
23Also see Cortes (2006), Lewis (2003), Ottaviano and Peri (2006), Peri (2007), and Saiz (2003).
24This is due to information networks between immigrants and their country of origin, as well as to the immigration policy of
the US. A documented less-educated immigrant is most likely to come to the US to join a family member.
18lation of each US state (calculated by the US Bureau of Census for year 2000 and available at www.census.gov).
Then, using the formula for geodesic distance, we calculate the distance of each state center to the closest section
of the US-Mexican Border in thousands of Kilometers.25 S i n c ew ea l r e a d yc o n t r o lf o rs t a t eﬁxed eﬀects in the
regressions, we interact the distance variable with 4 year dummies (from 1970 to 2000). This captures the fact
that distance from the border had a larger eﬀect in predicting the inﬂow of less-educated workers in decades
with larger Mexican immigration. The resulting set of instruments then includes the distance from the border
and the distance squared, both interacted with decade dummies. We also use a US-Mexico border dummy in-
teracted with decade dummies to capture the fact that border states had larger inﬂows of Mexican immigration
due to undocumented border crossings. Since illegal immigrants are less mobile across states, border states have
experienced a particularly large exogenous supply-driven increase of less-educated immigrant workers.
The rows of Table 5 report the respective two stage least squares estimates of γ, γM, γI,a n dγF.W eu s et h e
merged DOT deﬁnition to construct the task supply variables and, in turn, use the imputed share of Mexicans,
the distance from the border, and the border dummy as instruments.26 Columns 1-3 use the imputed share
of Mexicans as instruments. Column 1 weights the observations by employment, column 2 includes only male
workers in constructing the task supply variables, and column 3 performs unweighted OLS. Columns 4-6 use
the distance from the border and its square interacted with the decade dummies as instruments, and columns
7-9 use the border dummy interacted with decade dummies.
The last row of Table 5 reports the F-test of joint signiﬁcance of the instruments in explaining the endoge-
nous variable Share foreign Lst. Notice the remarkable explanatory power of the imputed share of Mexican
workers (F-statistics larger than 20) and geographic instruments (border distance and border dummy) in the
employment-weighted equations. When we do not weight observations by employment, the power of the border
dummy decreases signiﬁcantly. This is due to the relevance of California and Texas, border states and large
recipients of Mexican immigrants and among the largest states, that are weighted heavily in WLS regressions.
The 2SLS estimates conﬁrm the OLS results of Table 4. The estimates of γ are always negative and
signiﬁcant. They now range between -0.15 and -0.50 with WLS estimates clustering around -0.2. In the majority
of the cases, natives respond to increases in the share of foreign-born workers by signiﬁcantly raising interactive
task supply. The supply of manual tasks experiences an insigniﬁcant decrease. Finally, the correlation between
immigration and foreign-born relative task supply is never signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0.
25We divide the US-Mexico border in 12 sections and calcualte the distance of each center of gravity with each section and then
choose the shortest distance for each state.
26We also performed separate regressions exclusively using the DOT 1977 deﬁnition and the DOT 1991 deﬁnition. Each generated
very similar estimates.
194.2.2 Robustness Checks and Response of Speciﬁc Groups of Native Workers
Table 6 tests the robustness of the 2SLS estimates and performs a test of exogeneity of the instruments. In
particular, using the same speciﬁcation as in column 1 of Table 5, the ﬁrst four columns of Table 6 demonstrate
how the estimates of γ, γM,a n dγI vary from least square estimates, to 2SLS using only imputed Mexicans
as instrument (column 2), to using the geographic variables (distance and border interacted with decades),
to using all of the instruments together (column 4). Speciﬁcations 5 to 8 replicate 1 to 4 but redeﬁne less-
educated workers as those with no high school diploma. The last three rows of the table report the F-test of
joint signiﬁcance of the instruments and the Hausman test of over-identifying restrictions that can be performed
when we use more instruments than endogenous variables (columns 3, 4, 7, and 8).27 The value reported in
the second to last row is the Chi-squared test statistic under the null hypothesis that none of the instruments
appear in the second stage regression. The degrees of freedom are given by the diﬀerence between the number
of instruments and endogenous variables (this equals 7 in columns 3 and 7, and 8 in columns 4 and 8). The last
row reports the probability of obtaining the observed value of the test statistic or higher under the null. We
cannot reject the null at any level of signiﬁcance, so the assumption of instrument exogeneity stands.
More importantly, the point-estimates of γ using the 2SLS method with all instruments are quite precise,
not far from the OLS estimates, and signiﬁcantly negative. Regardless of the deﬁnition of less-educated workers,
we obtain 2SLS estimates using all instruments that are close to -0.2 (-0.22 and -0.23 respectively). The esti-
mates with geographic instruments and those using all instruments together conﬁrm that increased immigration
produces a signiﬁcant increase in interactive task supply and a less signiﬁcant (often insigniﬁcant) decrease of
manual task supply by natives. Reassured by the test of exogeneity and by the stability of the IV estimates, we
will mostly use the geographic instruments and all instruments together in the rest of the paper.
Distributional and policy concerns often push the analysis of immigration toward its eﬀect on speciﬁcd e -
mographic groups. It is important to understand how speciﬁc native-born age-education groups respond to
immigration. Groups who specialize in interactive task-intensive occupations are better equipped to mitigate
wage losses. Thus, analysis of speciﬁc groups will identify those who are at a greater risk of experiencing wage
losses.
Table 7 reports estimates of γ from regression (23) for speciﬁc sub-groups of less-educated natives using
2SLS method and all the instruments together. The ﬁrst three columns separate workers into three education
groups (those with 0 to 4, 5 to 9, and 9 to 12 years of schooling) and two age groups (25 to 45 and 46 to 65
years old). The supply-response of natives to immigrants is large and signiﬁcant for people with 9 to 12 years of
education in each age sub-group. This education cohort comprised 95% of US-born workers with a high school
degree or less in 2000. The intermediate group of native workers with 5 to 8 years of education also responded
27See Woolridge (2002).
20by shifting supply to more interactive-intensive occupations. While γ for workers of all ages is close to 0.2, it
is not very signiﬁcant. However, γ is signiﬁcant for younger workers. The group of least educated workers (0
to 4 years) does not seem to respond to immigration, however they only represent 0.5% of native workers with
at most a high school diploma. Altogether, analysis of narrowly deﬁned education and age groups reveals that
most groups of native workers respond to immigration by changing their task supply.
Similarly, women have an estimated γ (reported in the last column) very similar to the value estimated
for all workers (-0.22). The estimate is larger in absolute value for older (-0.46) than younger (-0.12) workers.
Columns 4 reports the task supply response of less-educated native-born black workers. Previous research has
emphasized a disproportionate eﬀect of immigration on labor market outcomes of black Americans (e.g. Borjas
et. al. (2006)). Interestingly, while black Americans seem to have reduced their relative supply of manual
tasks in response to immigration (γ = −0.16), the estimate is not signiﬁcant (standard error of 0.29). By
disaggregating the eﬀects over age groups, we see that young black workers particularly did not respond to
immigration by supplying interactive tasks. Certainly, this result would imply a higher risk of competition of
immigration on wages paid to black Americans.
4.2.3 Native Employment Response
The native task supply response to immigration is identiﬁed using data on working individuals in each state-
year. An alternative response mechanism could be that nat i v e sl o s eo rq u i tt h e i rj o b s ,o rp o s s i b l yl e a v et h e i r
s t a t eo fe m p l o y m e n te n t i r e l y .I nt h el o n gr u n ,w ee x p e c t competitive labor markets will cause wages to adjust
to full employment. Several studies of this displacement eﬀect at the state or city level fail to ﬁnd evidence
for its existence.28 Nonetheless, we must analyze the less-educated native-born employment and working age
population (L)st response for completeness. Consider the regression speciﬁcation in (28).
ln(L)st = αL
s + τL
t + η(Share foreign Lst)+εL
st (28)
Table 8 reports the estimates of η using both employment (columns 1 to 4) and the working age population
(columns 5 to 9) to measure the dependent variable (L)st.I nt h eﬁrst row of Table 8 we consider all less-educated
individuals. In the second and third row we consider the eﬀect of immigration by age-group. As workers with
similar education and age characteristics are more likely to compete for similar jobs, the impact of immigrants
by demographic group can be larger than the overall eﬀect. Columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 display WLS results (with
employment weighted observations), while 3, 4, 7 and 8 use 2SLS using all instrumental variables together.
Finally we alternatively use workers with no high school degree (columns 1, 3, 5 and 7) and workers with at
most an high school degree (Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8) to deﬁne less-educated workers. The reported standard
28See Card (2001, 2007), Card and Lewis (2007), Ottaviano and Peri (2007) and Peri (2007).
21errors are heteroskedasticity robust and are clustered by state. Regardless of the deﬁnition of less-educated
workers, the method of estimation, or the age group considered, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect of immigration on
the employment and population of native workers. The estimates of η are not very precise (generally smaller
than 0.4 in absolute value), often positive, and never signiﬁcantly less than zero. Overall, these estimates conﬁrm
the results already found in the literature — there is no systematic displacement of native workers through job
losses or out of state migration due to immigration. Instead, previous sections showed that immigration causes
native workers to systematically reallocate their task supply toward interactive skills.
4.3 Immigration and Total Task Supply
The regression speciﬁcation in (29) provides a test of Proposition 2, which states that the total relative supply
of manual versus interactive tasks is larger in economies with a larger share of immigrants. That is, the higher
















st by aggregating the supply of manual and interactive tasks from all less-educated workers
in state s and year t. Proposition 2 implies that γ
TOT > 0. However, we can also test how immigration aﬀects
the average amount of manual (μ) and interactive (ι) tasks supplied in equilibrium by running two separate
regressions, similar to (29), with ln(μ)st and ln(ι)st as dependent variables. Analogous to the speciﬁcations in
(24) and (25), we call these coeﬃcients γM
TOT and γI
TOT.
The ﬁrst three rows of Table 9 show the parameter estimates of γ
TOT, γM
TOT,a n dγI
TOT.T h el a s tt h r e er o w s
show the F-test of signiﬁc a n c ef o rt h ei n s t r u m e n t si nt h eﬁrst stage and the test of over-identifying restrictions.
Results for workers with a high school degree or less are in columns 1 to 4; columns 5 to 9 are for high school
dropouts. Each 2SLS regression exhibits positive and signiﬁcant estimates of γ
TOT,c o n ﬁrming the prediction
of Proposition 2. For workers with high school degree or less, γ
TOT is estimated around 0.3. This arises due
to a large increase in the average supply of manual tasks due to to immigration (γM
TOT =0 .21) and a small
decline in interactive task supply (γI
TOT = −0.08). Hence, states with large inﬂows of less-educated immigrants
experience signiﬁcant increases in manual relative to interactive task supply as predicted by theory.
4.4 Controlling for Task Demand and Technological Change
Our period of analysis is associated with large changes in production technologies, particularly in the diﬀusion
of information technologies and computer adoption. Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) demonstrate that this
change had a large eﬀect in shifting demand from routine tasks to non-routine tasks. Similarly, the increasing
22importance of advanced services, the demise of manufacturing, and other sector-shifts might have contributed
substantially to diﬀerences across states in the demand for manual and interactive tasks. In this section we
explicitly introduce controls for a state’s technology level and sector composition that may have confounded the
correlation between immigration and task intensity in our prior analysis.
We begin by including the share of workers (with at most a high school degree) who use a computer at
work to control for the diﬀusion of information technology (IT) across states. This data is available in the CPS
Merged Outgoing Rotation Group Surveys in 1984, 1997 and 2001. We match the 1984 computer data to the
1980 Census data, the 1997 computer-use data to the 1990 Census, and the 2001 computer-use data to the 2000
CPS data. We impute a share of 0 for all states in 1970 and 1960 since the PC was ﬁrst introduced in 1981.
The estimates reported in columns 1 and 4 of Table 10 are obtained with 2SLS using all instruments and
weighting observations by their corresponding employment. First, the eﬀect of immigration on the relative task
supply of natives (-0.3) remains negative and signiﬁcant (column 1), while the eﬀect on aggregate relative task
supply (0.21) is still positive and signiﬁcant (column 4). Second, computer technology reduces relative task
supply as predicted, since computers decreased the relative productivity of manual versus interactive tasks. The
IT variable, interpretable as a decrease in the parameter βL in the theoretical model, has the same eﬀect on
equilibrium task supply among natives and immigrants.
Our second control accounts more explicitly for the industrial composition of each state in 1960 and its
eﬀect on task demand. We create state-speciﬁc indices of manual versus interactive task demand driven by




, by assuming that the occupational composition of industries and
industry-speciﬁc employment shocks are uniform across states. First, we calculate EHFit and DCPit values





Next, we calculate industry-level national employment growth since 1960, gi,t. By assuming that industries grew
at their national growth rates regardless of the state in which they are located, we can predict the employment
share of industries within each state in each census year, \ EmpSharei,s,t. Finally, we calculate a state’s level
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s,t as a control for sector-driven changes in task intensity.




s,t and the computer use variable. When included by itself, the variable
23has very signiﬁcant explanatory power but does not change the coeﬃcient on the share of less-educated foreign-
born workers. When included with the IT control, immigration’s eﬀect on the relative task supply of natives
becomes much larger in magnitude (-0.42), while the overall eﬀect (0.08) is reduced in size and signiﬁcance.
Regressions also indicate that immigration increases native-born interactive task supply, and reduces native-
born manual task supply. In the aggregate, states with large immigrant shares have larger manual task supply,
but interactive tasks remain unaﬀected.
4.5 Immigration and the Relative Compensation of Tasks
Proposition 3 suggests that by increasing the relative supply of manual tasks in a state, immigrants decrease
the wage paid to manual tasks relative to interactive ones. In this section, we proceed to estimate the eﬀect
of immigration on the relative wages paid to tasks. The task demand function in Equation (3) for state s
during year t implies that Equation (32) describes the relationship between the relative supply of manual versus
interactive tasks among less-educated workers (M
























We allow relative productivity (βL) to vary systematically across states (due to diﬀerences in industrial
composition) and over time (due to technological change). We also permit a random, zero-mean, idiosyncratic
component in relative productivity. Exogenous shifts in the overall relative supply of manual versus interactive
tasks across states can identify the coeﬃcient 1
θL,w h e r eθL represents the elasticity of substitution between
the tasks. Hence we estimate Equation (33) using two stage least squares. Exogenous shifts in the share of
foreign-born workers will aﬀect the aggregate relative supply of skills. Hence, we can estimate 1
θL by employing


















While we calculated M
I in the previous sections by state, aggregation of the individual supply of manual
(EHF)a n di n t e r a c t i v e( DCP) tasks for the labor force prohibits direct observation of the relative wage wM
wI .
However, the IPUMS data contains individual-level information on wages and other characteristics that we can
merge with an individual’s supply of EHF and DCP.M e a s u r e m e n t o f wM and wI for each state and year
requires two steps for each year in our sample. First, we select only workers with at most a high school degree
and regress, by year, the natural logarithm of individual real weekly wages29 on indicator variables for the
29Real weekly wages are calculated by dividing the yearly salary income by the number of weeks worked in the year. The
nominal ﬁgures are converted into real ﬁgures using the CPI-U deﬂa t o rp u b l i s h e db yt h eB u r e a uo fL a bor Statistics and available
at www.bls.gov/cpi.
24number of years of education (12 indicators from 0 to 12), years of experience (40 indicators from 1 to 40),
a gender dummy, and a race dummy (white versus non-white).30 The residuals of these regressions represent
individual wages after controlling for personal characteristics, which we label ln(wage clean)ist for individual i
residing in state s in census year t.
In the second step, we transform the wages into levels and regress them on the individual measures of EHF
and DCP using weighted least squares. We allow the coeﬃcients on these skill variables to vary across the 51
states so that they capture the price of manual and interactive tasks in each state. Therefore, by separately
estimating the second stage regression in Equation (34) for each year, we can identify the state and year-speciﬁc
wages received for supplying manual (wML)st and interactive (wIL)st tasks.
wage cleanist =( wM)st ∗ EHFist +( wI)st DCPist + εist (34)
Next, we substitute the estimates d wMst and c wIst into Equation (33) to estimate 1
θL. Table 11 reports the
results for diﬀerent DOT deﬁnitions (1991, 1977, and merged) as in Table 4. Columns 1, 4, and 7 report the
estimates of 1







. The instrument is relatively powerful (F-statistic of 14), and we obtain estimates statistically
signiﬁcant at the 10 or 5% level between 1.3 and 1.45.






with our geographic instruments in columns 2, 5, and 8. The speciﬁcations in 3, 6, and 9 use the geographic
IVs and the imputed share of Mexicans. Unfortunately, the instruments are quite weak (F-statistics near 4)




st, so the standard errors increase and the signiﬁcance of the estimates decreases.
However, the point estimates of 1
θL remain consistently around one.
The 2SLS estimates using Share foreign Lst as an instrument imply that the share of foreign-born workers
reduces the relative compensation paid to manual tasks, thus conﬁrming Proposition 3. This arises due to the




st and the negative and signiﬁcant value of − 1
θL. The range
of point estimates in Table 11 suggest the elasticity of substitution (θL) ranges between 0.7 and 1.1. Even
assuming the largest estimate (1.1), manual and interactive tasks have a high degree of complementarity. These
ﬁgures are comparable to commonly estimated values for the elasticity of substitution between less and more
educated workers (σ) available in the literature, which fall between 1.5 and 2.31
30We also weight each individual b yi t sC e n s u ss a m p l ew e i g h t .
31See Katz and Murphy (1992) or Angrist (1995).
255S i m u l a t e d E ﬀects of Immigration on Real Wages
Our empirical analysis suggests that to understand the wage implications of immigration, simulations must
account for the adjustment in native-born task supply. We do so by combining the formulas derived in Section 2
with the estimated response of μD and ιD to immigration from Section 4.2 and the elasticity (θL) from Section
4.5. First, we use Equations (15), (17) and (18) and the changes in H, M,a n dI due to immigration between
1990 and 2000 to evaluate the eﬀects of immigration on compensation paid to highly-educated workers, manual
tasks, and interactive tasks. Then we combine those results with Equation (20) to ﬁnd the overall eﬀect of
immigration on average wages paid to less-educated native workers.
The simulated eﬀect of immigrants on average wages paid to less-educated native workers diﬀers from





for two reasons. First, the change in











less heavily, for natives. Since immigrants supply more manual tasks, we know that
∆M
M > ∆I
I . This implies ∆wM
wM (which is usually negative) is smaller than ∆wI
wI (which is positive for some
states). Hence, the large wage loss from manual tasks is weighted less in occupations chosen by natives. This
attenuation grows larger if natives increasingly specialize in interactive tasks, and is much stronger in high
immigration states.
Second, the empirical results suggest the term (∆μD) wM
W D +( ∆ιD) wI
W D in Equation (20) also positively
contributes to the average wage of natives. On one hand, immigration increases ∆ιD and reduces ∆μD.U n i t










in 1990 and 2000.32 Moreover, this diﬀerential was larger in high immigration states so that immigration
shifted workers to occupations whose tasks were better compensated. On the other hand, the estimates from
Tables 4 and 6 imply that the positive impact of immigration on ∆ιD was generally larger than the negative
impact on ∆μD. Hence, higher demand for complementary services also had a positive eﬀect on average wages,
shifting natives to jobs with higher interactive content.
Table 12 reports the simulated eﬀects of immigration from 1990-2000 at the national level and for states
with unusually high levels of immigration. The ﬁrst two columns report the increase in employment due to








, respectively. Notice that for each reported state (except
New York) the percentage inﬂow of less-educated immigrants was larger than the inﬂow of more-educated ones.
For Arizona, Massachusetts, and Texas the inﬂow of less-educated was almost four times that of more-educated
workers.
32The estimates of g wM and f wI were obtained in Section 4.5 and are used in this section to calculate the shares of M and I in















tasks due to immigration. These ﬁgures are calculated by multiplying the average task-supply of immigrants
by the inﬂow of less-educated immigrants, and then dividing by the total task supply in 1990. In each state
considered, the percentage supply of manual tasks increased more than the supply of interactive tasks did. This
conﬁrms that immigrants specialized in manual-intensive occupations.
The following three columns (5, 6, and 7) apply the formulas (15), (17), and (18) to report the percentage
















tasks. We assume a value of σ =1 .75 that is in the middle of the range usually estimated
in the literature (1.5 to 2). We also set θL = 1, a value implying that skills are more substitutable than most
of our estimates ﬁnd.
Column 5 reports the percentage wage change of highly-educated American workers due to immigration.
Since the inﬂow of highly-educated immigrants was small relative to the inﬂow of less-educated ones, the wage
eﬀect on people with high education is usually positive (a gain of 1.3% at the national level).
The change in wages paid to manual versus interactive tasks (columns 6 and 7) is clearly more important for
understanding the eﬀects of immigration on less-educated workers. In Nevada, the compensation of manual tasks
performed by less-educated workers decreased by 5.2%, while the compensation of interactive tasks performed
by the same group increased by 0.5%. In Arizona, compensation for manual tasks decreased by almost 14%,
while compensation for interactive tasks only decreased 4.6%.
Column 8 reports the resulting eﬀect on the change in average wages paid to less-educated labor before





.T h a t i s , t h e s e ﬁgures are useful for identifying
the counter-factual wage eﬀects for less-educated native workers that are identiﬁed by models with perfect
substitutability between native and foreign-born workers. Column 9, by comparison, reports the actual simulated





. To calculate these ﬁgures, we use the formula in (20). We then compute the values of ∆ιD and
∆μD by multiplying the change in the foreign-born share of each state between 1990 and 2000 by the average
response of interactive and manual task supply to immigration from columns 1-4 of Table 6 (respectively +0.13
and -0.06). The resulting values are elasticities that, when multiplied by their initial values, equal ∆ιD and
∆μD.
Comparison of columns 8 and 9 highlights the most important feature of Table 12. Together they provide the
diﬀerence in wage eﬀects estimated using a simple model of homogeneous labor versus our model of comparative
advantage. At the national level, specialization reduces the wage loss of less-educated native workers by about
one percentage point (from -2.4% to -1.5%). In states with large immigration such as California or Arizona, task
reallocation reduces the wage loss by more than three percentage points. Specialization completely eliminates
27the wage losses in California. Except for Arizona (whose less-educated workers experience a 5.6% wage loss),
no state witnessed wage losses exceeding 2.1%. By specializing in interactive skill-intense occupations, less-
educated natives reduce wage losses by two to three percentage points in many high immigration states, and
one percentage point overall.
Finally the last two columns demonstrate how state-level averages still conceal a large degree of variation
in wage eﬀects across occupations. Column 10 shows the wage eﬀect of immigration on a postal clerk with
high school education or less. This is a job with relatively high interactive task intensity and low manual task
intensity. In contrast, column 11 shows the eﬀect of immigration on wages of hand packers, an occupation with
relatively high manual task requirements. Occupational choice makes a huge diﬀerence in determining the wage
losses in states with high immigration. In Texas, a hand packer would have suﬀered a 5% wage loss due to
immigration, while a postal clerk would have suﬀered only half that eﬀect. In Florida, the postal clerk would
have actually gained 0.5% of her real wage, but the hand packer would have lost 0.8% of hers. At the national
level, postal clerks only experienced a 1.2% wage decline, while hand packers lost 3.4%. In sum, less-educated
natives protected themselves from most of the negative wage eﬀects of immigration ﬁrst because they have
typically chosen jobs more similar to postal clerks than hand packers, and second because immigration pushed
them to seek such occupations at higher rates.
6 Conclusions
The eﬀects of immigration on wages paid to native-born workers with low levels of educational attainment
depend upon two critical factors. The ﬁrst is whether immigrants take jobs similar to those of native workers or
instead take diﬀering jobs due to inherent comparative advantages between native and foreign-born employees
in performing particular productive tasks. The second is whether US-born workers respond to immigration and
adjust their occupation choices to shield themselves from competition with immigrant labor.
This paper provides a simple and new theoretical framework and empirical evidence to analyze these issues.
We argue that production combines diﬀerent labor skills. Immigrants with little educational attainment have
a comparative advantage in manual and physical tasks, while natives of similar levels of education have a
comparative advantage in interactive and language-intensive tasks. Native and foreign-born workers specialize
accordingly. When immigration generates large increases in manual task supply, the relative compensation paid
to interactive tasks rises, thereby rewarding natives who progressively move to interactive-intensive jobs.
Our empirical analysis modiﬁed a dataset developed by Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) that measures the
task-content of occupations in the United States between 1960 and 2000. We ﬁnd strong evidence supporting
three implications of our theoretical model:
i) On average, less-educated immigrants supplied more manual relative to interactive tasks than natives
28supplied.
ii) In states with large immigration among the less-educated labor force, native workers shifted to occupations
intensive in interactive tasks, thereby reducing native workers’ relative supply of manual versus interactive tasks.
iii) In states with large immigration among the less-educated labor force, there is a larger relative supply
of manual versus interactive tasks than in states with low levels of immigration. This implies that immigrants
more than compensate for the change in skill supply among natives, and it ensures that manual task-intensive
occupations earn lower wages.
Since native-born workers respond to inﬂows of immigrant labor by specializing in occupations demanding
interactive tasks, the relative supply of interactive tasks by the average US-born worker has increased signif-
icantly in the recent decades. As a consequence, the wage loss of less-educated native workers in states with
large immigration was much smaller than predicted by models in which the labor supplied by less-educated
natives and immigrants is perfectly substitutable. In particular, we estimate that immigration of less-educated
workers only reduced average real wages paid to less-educated US-born workers by 1.5% between 1990 and 2000.
Without task specialization, that loss would have equaled 2.5%.
29References
Acemoglu, Daron (1998) “Why Do New Technologies Complement Skills? Directed Technical Change and Wage
Inequality.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113 (4), pp. 1055-1090.
Acemoglu, Daron (2002) “Directed Technical Change.” Review of Economic Studies, 69 (4), pp. 781-810.
Acemoglu, Daron and Fabrizio Zilibotti (2001) “Productivity Diﬀerences” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116
(2) pp. 563-606.
Altonji, Joseph J. and David Card (1991) “The Eﬀects of Immigration on the Labor Market Outcomes of
Less-Skilled Natives” in John M. Abowd and Richard Freeman eds., Immigration, Trade and the Labor Market,
Chicago, the University of Chicago Press.
Angrist, Joshua (1995) “The Economic Returns to Schooling in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.” American
Economic Review 85 (1995), pp. 1065-1087.
Autor David H., Frank Levy, and Richard Murnane (2003) “The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change:
an Empirical Exploration.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118 (4), pp. 1279-1333.
Bacolod, Marigee and Bernardo S. Blum (2006) “Two sides of the Same Coin: U.S. Residual Inequality and the
Gender Gap.” Manuscript, UC Irvine, March 2006.
Bacolod, Marigee, Bernardo S. Blum and William C. Strange (2006) “Skills in the City.” Manuscript, University
of Toronto, November 2006.
Borjas, George J. (1994) “The Economics of Immigration.” Journal of Economic Literature, 32 (4), pp. 1667-
1717.
Borjas, George J. (1995) “The Economic Beneﬁts from Immigration.” Journal of Economics Perspectives,9( 2 ) ,
pp. 3-22.
Borjas, George J. (1999) “Heaven’s Door.” Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford.
Borjas, George J. (2003) “The Labor Demand Curve is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of Immi-
gration on the Labor Market.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118 (4), 1335-1374.
Borjas, George J. (2006) “Native Internal Migration and the Labor Market Impact of Immigration” Journal of
Human Resources, 41 (2), pp. 221-258.
Borjas, George J., Richard Freeman, and Larry Katz (1997) “How Much do Immigration and Trade Aﬀect
Labor Market Outcomes?” B r o o k i n g sP a p e r so nE c o n o m i cA c t i v i t y , 1997 (1), pp. 1-90.
30Borjas, George J. and Larry Katz (2005) “The Evolution of the Mexican-Born Workforce in the United States.”
NBER Working paper #11281, April 2005.
Borjas, George J., Jeﬀrey Grogger, and Gordon Hanson (2006) “Immigration and African-American Employment
Opportunities: The Response of Wages, Employment and Incarceration to Labour Supply Shocks.” NBER
Working Paper, #12518.
Butcher, Katrin C. and David Card (1991) “Immigration and Wages: Evidence from the 1980s.” American
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 81 (2), 292-296.
Card, David (1990) “The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market.” Industrial and Labor
Relation Review, 43, pp. 245-257.
Card, David (2001) “Immigrant Inﬂows, Native Outﬂows, and the Local Labor Market Impacts of Higher
Immigration.” Journal of Labor Economics, 19 (1), pp. 22-64.
Card, David (2007) ”How Immigration Aﬀects U.S. Cities” CReAM Discussion Paper N. 11/07, London UK.
Card, David and John Di Nardo (2000) “Do Immigrant Inﬂows Lead to Native Outﬂows?” NBER Working
Paper #7578.
Card, David and Thomas Lemieux (2001) “Can Falling Supply Explain the Rising Returns to College for
Younger Men? A Cohort Based Analysis.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116 (2), pp. 705-746.
Card, David and Ethan Lewis (2007) “The Diﬀusion of Mexican Immigrants During the 1990s: Explanations
and Impacts” in Mexican Immigration to the United States, George J. Borjas editor, The University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, London, 2007.
Caselli F. and W. J. Coleman, (2006) ”The World Technology Frontier.”, American Economic Review,9 6( 3 ) .
pp. 499-522.
Cortes, Patricia (2006) “The Eﬀect of Low-Skilled Immigration on U.S. Prices: Evidence from CPI data.”
Manuscript, University of Chicago, March 2006.
Friedberg, Rachel and Jennifer Hunt (1995) “The Impact of Immigrants on Host Country Wages, Employment
and Growth.” Journal of Economic Perspectives,9( 2 ) ,p p .2 3 - 4 4 .
Friedberg, Rachel (2001) “The Impact of Mass Migration on the Israeli Labor Market.” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 116(4), pp. 1373-1408.
Grossman, Gene and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg (2006) “Trading tasks: A Simple Theory of Oﬀ-shoring.” NBER
Working Paper #12721, December 2006.
31Katz, Larry and Kevin Murphy (1992) “Change in Relative Wages 1963-1987: Supply and Demand Factors.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (1), 35-78.
Kugler Adriana and Mutlu Yuksel (2006) “The Impact of Less Skilled Immigration on U.S. Natives: Evidence
from Hurricane Mitch.” Manuscript, University of Houston, January 2006.
Lewis, Ethan (2005) “Immigration, Skill Mix, and the Choice of Technique,” Federal Reserve Bank of Philadel-
phia Working Paper #05-08.
Manacorda, Marco, Alan Manning, and Jonathan Wadsworth (2006) “The Impact of Immigration on the Struc-
ture of Male Wages: Theory and Evidence from Britain.” Manuscript, London School of Economics, August
2006.
National Research Council (1997) “The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Eﬀects of Immi-
gration.” National Academy Press, Washington D.C.
Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P. and Giovanni Peri (2006) “Rethinking the Eﬀects of Immigration on Wages” NBER
Working Paper #12497.
Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P. and Giovanni Peri (2007) ”The Eﬀect of Immigration on U.S. Wages and Rents”
manuscript U.C. Davis, August 2007.
Peri, Giovanni (2007) “Immigrants’ Complementarities and Native Wages: Evidence from California” NBER
Working Paper # 12956, March 2007, Cambridge, MA.
Ruggles, Steven , Matthew Sobek, Trent Alexander, Catherine A. Fitch, Ronald Goeken, Patricia Kelly
Hall, Miriam King, and Chad Ronnander (2005). Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 3.0
[Machine-readable database]. Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota Population Center [producer and distributor], 2004.
http://www.ipums.org.
Saiz, Albert (2003) “Immigration and Housing Rents in American Cities.” Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia,
Working Paper No. 03-12.
Woolridge J.L. (2002) “Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data.” MIT Press, Boston, MA.
32A Appendix - Derivation of Equations from Section 2
A.1 Equations from Section 2.1
Competitive labor markets and producers of YL and YH generate equilibrium conditions for relative input prices
and task compensation. By equating the marginal productivity of intermediate goods to their prices, we ﬁnd
the relationship between the relative price of intermediate goods and their relative demand in Equation (35).












A.2 Equations from Section 2.2
Maximization of WL,j with respect to lj in Equation (4) generates the optimal relative allocation of labor for
worker j in Equation (36). By rearranging the deﬁnitions of unit-task supply and substituting them into this










A.3 Equations from Section 2.3
The equilibrium relative compensation of tasks (12) is obtained by substituting (6) for domestic and foreign work-
ers into (11), and then equating it with the demand curve (3). Intuitively, this is the wage obtained when the av-
















A.4 Equations from Section 2.4
To isolate the eﬀect of immigration on wages, ﬁrst substitute (2) into the production function (1) and take the





























Highly-educated workers earn the unit price of the intermediate good they produce. The logarithmic diﬀer-
ential of (39) directly measures immigration’s eﬀect on highly-educated workers as expressed in (15).
33Wages paid to less-educated workers are divided into their manual and interactive components. The ﬁrst










can be obtained from logarithmic diﬀerentials of (37) and (38).
Note that (19) represents the average manual and interactive wage eﬀects weighted by their respective
supplies. Thus, we can express the ﬁrst order wage eﬀect for less-educated workers by substituting Equations
(17) and (18) for ∆wM
wM and ∆wI
wI and simplifying to obtain Equation (16).33 Calculations of the eﬀect of
immigration on the average native-born less-educated worker (20) and of a worker in occupation j (21) are then
described in the main text.
Derivation of ∆YL
YL requires several steps. First, since YL is produced under perfect competition using
services of less-educated workers, we know that the total income generated in sector YL will be distributed to
less-educated workers as in Equation (40).
PLYL = WLL = wMM + wII (40)
This allows us to relate changes in the production of YL to small changes of inputs M and I as in Equation
(22). The formal proof hinges only on constant returns to scale to M and I in (2). First, re-write Equation


























dI . Distributing the diﬀerentiation with
















































YL equals one (Euler
Condition). Constant returns also imply that the second derivatives (with respect to M or I), multiplied by
the shares M
YL and I














Finally, we label the term wMM
PLYL = wMM
WLL as κM,a n d wII
PLYL = wII
WLL as (1−κM). We then use ∆,r a t h e rt h a n
d, to indicate a small (rather than an inﬁnitesimal) change to obtain equation (22).


















Table 1: Median Supply of Interactive and Manual Tasks, All Workers, 1960-2000 
 



















0.50 0.53  0.59  0.61  0.62 
Occupation  Male 
Shoemakers 






















Note: The variables DCP and EHF are based on the scores assigned to each occupation by the Dictionary of 
Occupational Titles (DOT) in 1977 for 1960, 1970, and 1980, and the scores assigned by the DOT in 1991 for 
1990 and 2000. They are converted into percentile scores using the 1960 distribution so that median values 
equal 0.5 in 1960 by construction. 
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Table 2:  
Relative Manual and Interactive Task Requirements  
and the Percentage of Foreign-Born Workers in Selected Occupations, 2000, High School Diploma or Less 
 














Agricultural Laborer  63% 0.72  0.28  2.5 
Farm Coordinator  4% 0.30  0.70  0.43 
Construction Sector 
Construction Helper  66% 0.97  0.03  43 
Construction 
Supervisor 




48% 0.94  0.06  17.5 
Mail Clerk/ 
Deliverer 




33% 0.56  0.44  1.63 
Supervisor Food 
Preparation 
14% 0.36  0.64  0.58 
Transportation Services 
Taxi Driver  40% 0.98  0.02  49.5 
Supervisor, Motor 
Vehicle Operators 
10% 0.31  0.67  0.45 
Note: Occupations are defined by the Census. Data for the year 2000 are obtained averaging the CPS samples for 1998, 1999 and 
2000 as described in the text. The indices EHF and DCP are those obtained using the 1991 DOT definitions.  












Note For the few state-year observations in which the foreign-born share of less-educated employment was smaller than 1%, the calculation of relative task 
supply is noisy and unreliable because it is based on a very small sample. The relative supply of tasks for native, foreign-born, and recent immigrants equals 











































  Relative Task Supply Calculated for all Less-
Educated Immigrants 
Relative Task Supply Calculated for  Less-Educated 
New Immigrants (Less than 10 Years in the US)  
Percentage of State-Year 
Observations for which  
(MF/IF) > (MD/ID) 
80%  88% 100% 87%  96% 100% 
Total Number of State-
Year Observations 








Impact of Foreign-Born Workers on the Supply of Tasks of US Natives, Least Squares Estimates  
Workers with a High School Degree or Less 
 
Explanatory Variable: Foreign-Born Share of Workers with a High School Degree or Less 


















































Domestic Workers  
Ln( D μ ) 
γ



















Ln( D ι ) 
γ








































  255  255 255 255  255 255 255  255 255 
 
 
Note: Each cell contains estimates from separate regressions. The dependent variable in each is indicated in the first column. The explanatory variable is the foreign-born 
share of less-educated workers.  The units of observation in each regression are U.S. states in a census year (decennial panel of 50 states plus DC from 1960-2000) for a total 
of 255 observations. All regressions include state and year fixed effects. The method of estimation is least squares. In specifications (1), (2), (4), (5), (7) and (8) we weight 
observations by employment, and the standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state. In specifications (3), (6) and (9) we perform unweighted OLS with 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.  In Specifications (1)-(3) the task supply is obtained using the 1977 DOT, in specifications (4)-(6) we use the 1991 DOT 
definitions, while in (6)-(9) we use the 1977 DOT definition for 1960, 1970 and 1980 and the 1991 DOT definition for 1990 and 2000.  
** indicates significance at the 5% level 




Impact of Foreign-Born Workers on the Supply of Tasks of US Natives, 2SLS Estimates  
Workers with a High School Degree or Less 
 
Explanatory Variable: Foreign-Born Share of Workers with a High School Degree or Less 
Instruments  Imputed  Share of Mexican 
Immigrants 
Distance from the Border  and 
Distance Squared  
Interacted with Decades 
US-Mexico Border Dummy 
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γ




























































Number  of  Observations  255 255 255 255  255  255 255 255 255 
 
Note: Each cell contains estimates from separate regressions. The dependent variable in each is indicated in the first column. The explanatory variable is the foreign-born 
share of less-educated workers.  The units of observation in each regression are U.S. states in a census year (decennial panel of 50 states plus DC from 1960-2000) for a total 
of 255 observations. All regressions include state and year fixed effects. The method of estimation is two stage least squares. Specifications (1)-(3) instrument using the 
imputed share of Mexican described in the main text. Specifications (2)-(4) instrument using the distance between the center of gravity of the state and the Mexico-US 
border, interacted with four decade dummies. Specifications (7)-(9) use a dummy equal to one for states on the US-Mexico border, interacted with four decade dummies.  
We use the 1977 DOT definition for 1960, 1970 and 1980 and the 1991 DOT definition for 1990 and 2000. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, clustered by state, are 
reported in parenthesis.  
** indicates significance at the 5% level   40
Table 6 
Impact of Foreign-Born Workers on the Supply of Tasks of US Natives, Multiple Instruments 
 
Explanatory Variable: Foreign-Born Share of Less-Educated Workers 
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Test of Over-Identifying 
Restrictions 
(Specification in First Row) 
NA  NA 3.82 8.92 NA NA 2.55 7.65 
Probability (χ
2 > test)  
under the Null of Exogeneity of 
Instruments  
NA NA 81%  35% NA NA 92%  47% 
Observations  255  255 255 255 255 255 255 255 
 
Note: Each cell contains estimates from separate regressions. The dependent variable in each is indicated in the first column. The explanatory variable is the foreign-born 
share of less-educated workers.  The units of observation in each regression are U.S. states in a census year (decennial panel of 50 states plus DC from 1960-2000) for a total 
of 255 observations. All regressions include state and year fixed effects. The method of estimation is two stage least squares. Each observation is weighted by employment, 
and the standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state. The last two rows report the Hausman test of overidentifying restrictions that can be performed 
when we use more instruments that endogenous variables. We report the test statistic and the p-value, namely the probability that χ
2 is larger than the observed statistic under 
the null hypothesis of the exogeneity of the instruments. 
** indicates significance at the 5% level   41
Table 7 
Impact of Foreign-Born Workers on the Supply of Tasks of Detailed Demographic Groups 
 
Explanatory Variable: Foreign-Born Share of Workers within a Particular Demographic Group 
 





with 0-4 Years 
of Schooling 
Individuals with 














Degree or Less 
 






























Number of Observations  255  255  255  255  255 
 
Note: Each cell contains the estimate of the parameter γ  from a separate regression that only includes natives and immigrants belonging to the specified demographic 
group. The units of observation in each regression are U.S. states in a census year (decennial panel of 50 states plus DC from 1960-2000) for a total of 255 observations. 
All regressions include state and year fixed effects. The method of estimation is two stage least squares using all instruments. Each observation is weighted by 
employment, and the standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state. 














Effects of the Foreign-Born Share of Employment on Native-Born Employment and Population.  
Less-Educated Workers by Age Group 
 
Dependent Variable:  Ln(EmploymentD) Ln(PopulationD) 











































































Observations  255 255 255 255 255  255  255 255 
 
Note: Each cell contains estimates from separate regressions. The explanatory variable is the foreign-born share of workers in the group. The dependent variable is 
either the logarithm of native employment (columns 1-4) or the logarithm of native population (columns 5-8) in the group. The units of observation in each regression 
are U.S. states in a census year (decennial panel of 50 states plus DC from 1960-2000) for a total of 255 observations. The method of estimation is either Least Squares 
(columns 1, 2, 5 and 6) or 2SLS (columns 2, 4, 6 and 8) using all the instruments. All regressions include state and year fixed effects. Each observation is weighted by 
employment, and the standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state. 
 
   43
Table 9 
Impact of Foreign-Born Workers on the Total Supply of Tasks 
 
Note: Each cell contains estimates from separate regressions. The dependent variable in each is indicated in the first column. The explanatory variable is the foreign-born 
share of less-educated workers.  The units of observation in each regression are U.S. states in a census year (decennial panel of 50 states plus DC from 1960-2000) for a total 
of 255 observations. All regressions include state and year fixed effects. The method of estimation is two stage least squares. Each observation is weighted by employment, 
and the standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state. The last two rows report the Hausman test of overidentifying restrictions that can be performed 
when we use more instruments that endogenous variables. We report the test statistic and the p-value, namely the probability that χ
2 is larger than the observed statistic under 
the null hypothesis of the exogeneity of the instruments. 
Explanatory Variable: Foreign-Born Share of Less-Educated Workers 
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γ
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Test of Over-Identifying 
Restrictions 
(Specification in First Row) 
NA  NA 3.82 8.92 NA NA 2.55 7.65 
Probability (χ
2 > test)  
under the Null of Exogeneity 
of Instruments  
NA  NA 81%  35% NA NA 92%  47% 
Observations  255  255 255 255 255 255 255 255   44
** indicates significance at the 5% level 
Table 10 
Impact of Foreign-Born Workers on the Supply of Tasks of US Natives, Controlling for Technology and Demand Factors 
 
Dependent Variable: Relative Task Supply, Ln(Manual/Interactive) 
 Dependent  Variable:  Task Supply of Domestic 
Workers, Ln(MD/ID) 
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  Decomposition of the Effect on Manual and 
Interactive Tasks 
Decomposition of the Effect on Manual and 
Interactive Tasks 
Effect of Foreign-Born Share 













Effect of Foreign-Born Share 













Number of Observations  255 255  255  255  255  255 
 
Note:  The top three rows report estimates of the impact of the foreign-born share, percentage of computer users, and industry-driven change in relative task intensity 
on the relative task supply of natives (columns 1 to 3) and overall relative task supply (columns 4 to 6). The bottom two rows report the effect of immigration on the 
supply of manual and interactive tasks when we control for the computer use and sector-driven variables.  The units of observation in each regression are U.S. states 
in a census year (decennial panel of 50 states plus DC from 1960-2000) for a total of 255 observations. All regressions include state and year fixed effects. The 
method of estimation is two stage least squares. Each observation is weighted by employment, and the standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by 
state. 
** indicates significance at the 5% level   45
 
Table 11 
Estimates of the Relative Wage Elasticity of Manual versus Interactive Tasks 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Wage Paid to Manual Tasks / Wage Paid to Interactive Tasks 




Geographic All   Foreign-
Born 
Share 
Geographic   All   Foreign-
Born 
Share 























0.69 0.96  1.05 0.75 1.02  1.11 0.77 1.05  1.05 




16.2 4.03  4.05 16.2 4.03  4.05 16.2 4.03  4.05 
Observations  255 255  255 255 255  255 255 255  255 
 
 
Note: The explanatory variable is the negative of the logarithm of the relative supply of manual versus interactive tasks among all workers. In specifications (1), (4) 
and (7) we use the foreign-born share of less-educated workers as an instrument for the relative supply of manual versus interactive tasks in the state. In specification 
(2), (5) and (8), the instrument is the portion of the foreign-born share explained by the geographic variables (border distance and border dummies). In specifications 
(3), (6) and (9), the instrument is the portion of the foreign-born share explained by the geographic variables plus the imputed share of Mexicans. The units of 
observation in each regression are U.S. states in a census year (decennial panel of 50 states plus DC from 1960-2000) for a total of 255 observations. All regressions 
include state and year fixed effects. The method of estimation is two stage least squares. Each observation is weighted by employment, and the standard errors are 
heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state. In Specifications (1)-(3) the task supply is obtained using the 1977 DOT, in specifications (4)-(6) we use the 1991 
DOT definitions, while in (6)-(9) we use the 1977 DOT definition for 1960, 1970 and 1980 and the 1991 DOT definition for 1990 and 2000. 
** indicates significance at the 5% 
* indicates significance at the 10% level 
 
 

















































Arizona  5.7% 24.2% 32.6% 23.3% 3.6% -13.8%  -4.6% -9.0% -5.6%  -6.4%  -12.0% 
California  7.0% 13.9% 16.9% 12.1% 1.1%  -5.5% -0.7%  -3.1%  0.0%  -1.7%  -4.6% 
Colorado  5.3% 11.2% 14.6% 10.6% 1.0%  -5.2%  -1.2% -3.1% -1.7%  -2.0%  -4.4% 
DC  1.2%  3.6% 4.5% 3.2% 0.3% -1.9%  -0.7% -1.1% 0.2%  -0.9%  -1.7% 
Florida 10.6%  10.0%  11.8%  9.7%  0.0%  -1.2%  0.9% 0.0% 1.6%  0.5%  -0.8% 
Illinois  2.3%  4.4% 4.9% 3.7% 0.4% -1.3% -0.1%  -0.8%  0.3%  -0.4%  -1.1% 
Massachusetts  1.6%  7.4% 8.9% 7.1% 1.1% -3.5%  -1.7% -2.5% -0.9%  -2.0%  -3.1% 
Nevada  13.8%  18.6% 23.4% 17.7% 1.5%  -5.2% 0.5%  -2.4%  0.1%  -0.7%  -4.0% 
New  Jersey  3.7%  4.4% 5.3% 3.6% 0.1% -1.2% 0.5%  -0.3%  1.6%  0.2%  -0.9% 
New  York  5.6%  4.4% 5.5% 3.7%  -0.2%  -0.6%  1.3% 0.4% 2.7%  0.9%  -0.2% 
Oregon  6.4% 12.4% 16.7% 12.7% 1.6%  -5.0% -1.0% -3.4% -2.0%  -1.8%  -4.2% 
Texas  4.2% 13.1% 15.6% 11.7% 1.7%  -5.7% -1.8% -3.7% -2.1%  -2.5%  -4.9% 
United States  4.0% 6.0% 10.2% 6.5% 1.3% -4.2% -0.4%  -2.4%  -1.5% -1.2%  -3.4% 
Note: The variables and parameters used in the simulations reported above are described in the text. In particular, we assumed σ=1.75 and θL=1. The twelve 
states chosen are those with higher foreign-born employment shares or with high levels of immigration between 1990 and 2000. The parameters used to estimate 
the change in task-supply of native workers in response to immigration are the average estimates from columns (1)-(4) in Table 6.    47
Figure 1 
Relative Manual/Interactive Task Supply and Demand 
 
Native-Born Workers of  Native and Foreign-Born Workers of 





































Relative Supply of 
Worker j1 



































ln(M/I)   48
Figure 2 
Relative Supply of Manual/Interactive Tasks in the US 


















1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Census Year
US Natives  Foreign-Born 
Recent Immigrants
Recent Immigrants are those in the US for less than 10 years
Relative Manual/Interactive Task Supply
 
 
Note: The relative supply of tasks for native, foreign-born, and recent immigrants reported above are obtained by aggregating the values of EHF and DCP over 
individuals of the relevant group, weighted by their Census weight, and calculating their ratio. The construction of the indices EHF and DCP is described in the 
main text. The indices used in the figures are those obtained using the 1977 DOT definition of task intensity for 1960, 1970 and 1980, and the 1991 DOT 
definitions for year 1990 and 2000.   49
Figure 3 
Share of Foreign-Born Workers and the Relative Supply of Manual/Interactive Tasks by Native-Born Workers,   
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Note: The vertical axis reports the relative skill supply (MD/ID) of native workers in 2000. The construction of the indices EHF and DCP is described in the main 
text. The horizontal axis reports the foreign-born share of workers with a high school diploma or less in 2000. 
 
Coefficient: -0.6 
Standard error:  0.1   50
Figure 4 
Relative Supply of Manual/Interactive Tasks 
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Note: The vertical axis reports the relative skill supply (MF/IF) of immigrants. The horizontal axis reports the relative skill supply (MD/ID) of natives. Points 
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Figure 5 
Relative Supply of Manual/Interactive Tasks 
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Note: The vertical axis reports the relative skill supply (MF/IF) of immigrants who have been in the US for ten years or less. The horizontal axis reports the 
relative skill supply (MD/ID) of natives. Points represent US states in Census years. Only observations in which the share of immigrant workers with a high 
school degree or less was at least 10% are included. 
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